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STATEMENT OF TEE CASE
A.

. .

Nature of the Case
This Is a third-party action i nsti tuted by Daniels to

foreclose a mechanic's li en 01 1 the Park h*\ renue Condom: n :i 1 ims 1 ("Pr o •
ject '•) 3 ocated in P< =11: k City , Utah . In Aug ust of 19 80, Park A venue
Development
-

J

:

Company entered

into a Bi 2 1 Id j ng Contract

Agreement

1 € J s pursuai 1 t: t ::: • ; ?rl: 1 :i c: 1: 1 Dani e3 s 1; - as to ser v e as • the Gener a

c ntractor for t h e construction o f t h e Project.

Darnels w a s to

b* p.? id approximate] y $80,000.00 "profit" for t h e u s e

i.ir; con- •

tractor's license, and a salary for the actual services he preformed
at the Project. Daniels was also a part owner of the Project and,
presumably, anticipated a profit when the Project was sold. Daniels
was paid approximately $15,000*00 for the actual work he performed
on the Project.
Construction of the Project was begun in or about August
of 1980 and, by July 30, 1981, all construction called for by the
Building Contract Agreement had been completed.

Certificates of

Final Inspection and Occupancy were issued by Park City in late
July of 1981.
On December 1, 1981, Daniels returned to the Project at
the request of co-owner Vance McDonald because several water pipes
had broken and the Project had suffered some water damage. Daniels
made no repairs. He merely assessed the damage and made some phone
calls to line up people who could make the repairs.

On that same

day, Daniels was informed by Vance McDonald that his services would
not be required.

Daniels undertook no further work.

On February 3, 1982, Daniels filed a Notice of Lien with
the Summit County Recorder against the Project, claiming a lien
for the $80,000.00 "profit" called for in the Building Contract
and listing the date of last work of December 1, 1981.
On February 25, 1982, the Honorable David B. Dee of the
Third District Court entered an Order Discharging Claims releasing
from the Project all of the recorded claims of Daniels and, further,
•

: ••

-

2

-

Ordering that Daniel s*" lien shal 1 have no effect as a 1 i en or i nterest upon the Project, upon the posting of a $75,000, 00 bond,

was granted ex parte, Daniel s, by and through hi s counsel of record,
stlpu lated that the Order discharge ng his li en coul d conti i n le in
effect iiiit 11 March 5 k 19 8 2 , whei i Daniels agreed to appear and show
cause why the Order should not be made permanent.
held ::: i :t March 5

1 982

an: id. c: i i Mar c h 1 5

No heari i lg was

1! 982

Dai ii el! s

tl: ii: on igh

h i s counsel, stipulated to continue the Order to Show Cam ise Hearing
until April 5, 1982 , Again no hearing was held and on Apr i 1 ] 9 ,

21! , 1982, pi aintiff # s Motion, for Summary Judgment was heard by
the Court.

On .June 2 3 , 1982, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwi n en •

teireiJ <ni M U I H I

pi a inL 11 i: ' s Miition 1'ur Summary Judgment

deny m y

arid decreeing that Daniels" Jieni was not cancelled cur1" vacated.
An Order to this effect was not signed by .imjcp Baldwin 'until February 2/,

I'JUJ,

Daniels never objected to Judge Dee's Order Dis-

charging Claims nor did he attack the sufficiency of the sureties
on the $7 5,0 JO no bnnb
After, the Order Discharging Claims was recorded on February 25,
•*

^':JH<'
!

- *

corded

-r '

Oeseret Federal made a loan to the owner of the
'it serurlncj repayment uT I. In:« I -

^i i r i ^h? *
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«., HI., re-

On October 21, 1983, Daniels filed an Amended Answer,
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint seeking to foreclose his
claimed mechanic's lien
B.

Course of Proceedings
The Third Judicial Court in and for Summit County, State

of Utah, the Honorable Philip R. Fishier presiding, granted Summary
Judgment in favor of Deseret Federal and against Daniels on June
18, 1984.
C.

Statement of Facts
le

In 1980, Daniels invested approximately $28,000.00

in the development of an 8-unit condominium project in Park City,
Utah ("Project")„
2.

(Deposition of Jack C. Daniels p. 12).

On August 14, 1980, Park Avenue Development Company

entered into a Building Contract Agreement with Daniels whereby
Daniels was to serve as the general contractor for the construction
of the Project.
3.

(R. 163).

In addition to being paid for his actual work on

the Project, Daniels was to receive an additional $80,000.00 for
"profit and overhead."

(Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 22-

23, 55)
4.

In late August of 1980, construction of the Project

commenced. (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, p. 24).
5.

Although

Daniels

had

been

paid

approximately

$15,000.00 for his actual work on the Project, he had not been
- 4 -

paid the $80,000,00 "overhead and profi t". (Deposition of Jack C.
Daniels, p 5 5 ) .
•rLtiVlinn
t;,~. Euildir-3 Contra : Agreement ».u
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36) Daniel s was not paid the $80,000,00 "profit

and overhead" within two weeks. (R. 149). .
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t ; :•

9o

On December 1, 1982, Daniels returned to the Project

to inspect several water pipes which had broken•

He undertook no

repairs and was informed that his services would not be required.
(Deposition of Jack C« Daniels,
10.

p. 50-51, 65-68).

On February 3, 1982, nearly three months after the

statutory filing deadline, Daniels filed a Notice of Lien with
the Summit

County Recorder

against the Project claiming the

$80,000.00 "profit and overhead."

(R. 36).

Daniels' Notice of

Lien listed December 1, 1981 as the date that the last work was
performed on the Project.
11.

On February 25, 1982, the Honorable David B. Dee

of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, entered an Order Discharging Claims which ordered:
that the recorded claims of [Daniels] as described in plaintiff's Complaint are hereby
released from [the Project], and shall have
no effect as a lien or an interest whatsoever
upon [project] . „ . upon the posting of a
bond in the amount of $75,000.00

4

(R. 13) .
12.

On February 25, 1982, an Undertaking and Bond was

filed with the Summit County Clerk in the amount of $75,000.00
and was recorded the same day.
13.

(R. 9 ) .

Daniels did not object to the sufficiency of the

Undertaking and Bond at any time.

- 6 -

(R. 1-291).

14.

On or about March 1, 1982, Deseret Federal recorded

its Deed of Trust securing repayment of a Note made by the owners
of the Project. (R. 145).
15.

On March 5, 1982, Daniels stipulated that the Order

Discharging Claims entered by Judge Dee and recorded on February
25, 1982, could remain in effect until a hearing scheduled for
March 5, 1982.
16.

(R. 15).
No hearing was held on the Order Discharging Claims

until June 21, 1982.
17.

(R. 113).

On July 13, 1982, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,

Jr. entered an Order vacating and cancelling any lis pendens filed
in connection with the Project, but not disturbing Judge Dee's
Order Discharging Daniels' lien
18.

(R. 120).

On February 18, 1983, Judge Baldwin entered an Amend-

ed Order ordering that Daniels' "lien not cancelled or vacated."
(R. 138).
19.

On October 21, 1983 Daniels filed this action against

Deseret Federal and others claiming an interest in the Project
seeking to foreclose his claimed mechanic's lien which, according
to Daniels, is prior to Deseret Federal's Deed of Trust.
20.

(R. 149) .

On April 6, 1984, Judge Fishier granted Deseret

Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment holding that Daniels' lien
was not timely perfected and was, therefore, invalid.

- 7 -

(R. 233).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Fishier's entry of Summary Judgment in Deseret
Federal's favor was proper because, as a matter of law, Daniels
did not file his Notice of Lien within the 100 day statutory period*
That period was not extended by Daniels' activity at the Project
on December 1, 1981* Furthermore, Daniels' activity at the Project
on December 1, 1981, did not constitute lienable work. As a thirdparty lender, Deseret Federal is not estopped to assert that the
untimely filing of Daniels Notice of Lien invalidates the lien.
There are no allegations of any kind that Deseret Federal participated in the events leading to a claim of estoppel.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT, AS
A MATTER OF LAW, WORK PERFORMED BY DANIELS ON
DECEMBER 1, 1981 DID NOT EXTEND THE TIME AS
TO WHICH A LIEN HAD TO BE FILED FOR WORK COMPLETED IN THE SUMMER OF 1981 NOR DID IT CONSTITUTE AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S
LIENo
This case comes on appeal from the entry of summary judgment against Daniels.

As such, the standard of review is that

enunciated by this Court in Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah
1979) as follows:
Our inquiry on review is whether there
is any genuine issue as to any material fact,
and if there is not, whether the [movants]
are entitled to judgment as a matter of lawe
[Citations omitted,] The [party opposing the
motion] cannot rely upon the mere allegations
- 8 -

or denials of [its] pleadings to avoid a summary
judgment but must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,
Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.
604 P.2d at 936.

The trial court correctly determined that no

material facts were in dispute as to the invalidity of Daniels'
lien.
In this case, Daniels' unequivocal admissions formed
the basis upon which the trial court determined, as a matter of
law, that Daniels had no properly perfected mechanic's lien interest
in the Project which is the subject of this action.
Although Daniels treats the validity question as a single
issue, there really are two separate, but related, issues.

The

first question is whether activities amounting to nothing more
than inspection of the premises and other work preparatory to making
certain repairs on a completed project are sufficient to extend
the time in which a lien with respect to work performed on the
original project may be filed under Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Ann.
(1953, as amended).

The second issue is whether that same prepa-

ratory activity provides an independent and sufficient basis for
entitlement to a mechanic's lien under Section 38-1-3, Utah Code
Ann. (1953, as amended), as to which Daniels' notice would concededly have been timely filed.1
1

Inasmuch as Daniels' mechanic's lien is concededly based
upon the value of services performed prior to December
1, 1981, there would be a question of fact as to the
reasonable value of the services rendered by Appellant
- 9 -

As to both issues, the trial court correctly determined
as a matter of law that the activities were insufficient to validate the claimed mechanic's lien,
A.

The work performed on December 1, 1981 was not substantial in connection with the underlying contract under
which the project was completed in the summer of 1981.
The record shows without contravention that Daniels'

construction contract was completed, and viewed as such by Daniels,
in July of 1981,

(Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 49-51.)

The supporting evidence includes Daniels' own statements under
oath (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 48-49) . It is undisputed
that, on December 1, 1981, Daniels came to the Project, assessed
the damage done by broken pipes, and attempted to line up subcontractors for the necessary repairs. (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels,
pp. 50-51, 65-68.)
In determining when additional work will extend the time
for filing a notice of mechanic's lien, the Utah Supreme Court
has consistently applied the rule first enunciated in Wilcox v.
Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, 6-8 (1936) as follows:

on December 1, 1981 were this Court to determine that
such services created an independent basis for the filing
of a mechanic's lien. This court expressly recognized
in Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah 130,
66 P. 779 (1901) (dictum) that in the absence of a special
contract fixing the value of the services, the lien is
limited to the reasonable value of the services renderede
There was no development of such a reasonable value in
the proceedings below.
- 10 -

Trivial or minor adjustments made casually or
long after the main work is completed cannot
be used to tie on to the last labor done or
materials furnished. Especially is this true
if they are made for that purpose. But even
small jobs where bona fide made to complete a
contract which the claimant had the duty to
complete, if not made too long after the main
work is completed, especially if a part of a
chain of similar or larger tasks performed in
the process of finishing up or tapering off,
will be sufficient to extend the time for filing
the notice of lien. . . .
. . . [T]he time for filing the lien may
be extended if the matter of work and labor
in . . . satisfactorily completing the job is
not so trivial or minor that the failure to
do it would still leave the contract substantially performed so that the recovery might
be had.
See also Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325,
327 (1969); Naale v. Club Fontainbleu. 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d
346 (1965) ; Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 (1965) ;
cf. Carlisle v. Cox. 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 P.2d 60 (1973) (applying
same doctrine in bonding statute context).
The test applied by this Court in the cases cited above
clearly includes two elements. First, the work must be substantial
in relation to the performance contracted for and, second, the
additional performance must occur relatively shortly after the
original "completion."

Deseret Federal submits that Daniels' work

of December 1, 1981 fails to satisfy either of these elements and
therefore the court below correctly determined as a matter of law
that such work could not extend the time for filing of Daniels7
- 11 -

notice of lien and therefore the filing on February 3, 1982 was
not timely under § 38-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) .
Each of these elements is discussed separately hereafter.
1.

Substantial Relation to Contract.

Daniels' argu-

ment seems to misapprehend the substantiality test applied in the
line of cases beginning with Wilcox.

He takes the position that

the test of whether substantial work was done is a question of
fact as to the amount of work performed (time and effort expended
or materials used), apparently in contrast to the performance of
no services whatsoever.

This clearly misconstrues the holding of

the Utah case law.
The test enunciated by the Utah court in determining
whether additional services or furnishing of additional materials
extends the time for filing a notice of mechanic's lien is whether
the amount of work is substantial in relation to the performance
contemplated by the contract.

The test itself was derived as a

extension of the familiar doctrine of "substantial performance."
In the seminal case, this Court has stated that the question of
substantiality of an additional performance may be restated as
whether the owner would have been able to successfully defend against the contractor's contract claim under the doctrine of substantial performance.

See Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 515, 56 P.2d

1, 7 (1936); cfa. Carlisle v. Cox. 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 P.2d 60, 62

- 12 -

(1973) (extending the same doctrine on the same principles, to
contractor bond cases).
Understanding the substantiality test in this light, it
is clear that the work performed by Daniels on December 1, 1981,
cannot, as a matter of law, be "substantial" as that term is used
in this context.

Daniels simply performed no additional work re-

quired under the original contract.

On December 1, 1981, he did

nothing to actually remedy the defects in the original performance
of his contract.

The work done under the original contract was

as defective when Daniels left the property on December 1, 1981
as it had been when he arrived.
If he or his subcontractors had actually performed the
repairs, there may well have been a question of fact as to whether
that work was "substantial."2

It is significant that the Wilcox

At least one jurisdiction has expressly held that repairs
of defective performance cannot extend the time for filing
the notice of lien. See H. E. Leonhardt Lumber Co. v.
Ed Wamble Distributing Co., 378 P.2d 771 (Okla. 1963).
A policy favoring such a rule is easily understood and
articulated. Inasmuch as the mechanic's lien right is
a creature of statute and in derogation of the common
law, compliance with the formal requisites of perfecting
such an interest are strictly construed. To permit a
contractor or other mechanic's lien claimant to extend
the time by repairing defects (particularly latent or
otherwise unknown defects) of the claimant's own making
allows a mechanic's lien claimant who has unsatisfactorily
(and in some cases fraudulently) performed the contract
to benefit from his own defective performance by enlarging
the time for filing of the notice of lien. The Wilcox
case is not necessarily repugnant to this position. In
Wilcox there had been a continuing course of cleaning
up of odds and ends on the project over a relatively
- 13 -

case specifically discusses a substantial repair necessitated by
defective performance of an original roofing contract*

The court

stateds
In the instant case the materials and labor
to complete the roof as it should have been
completed were necessary. It is not the case
of replacing a few panes of glass broken in
transit, but the case of work done to satisfactorily complete a contract. It can readily
be seen that there is a marked distinction
between permitting the time for filing a lien
to date from the time a minor replacement of
materials is made and the case where a contractor uses materials and labor in the matter of
actually making satisfactory a job which otherwise might have been considered as being incomplete. In the one case the time for filing
the lien may be extended if the matter of work
and labor in so satisfactorily completing the
job is not so trivial or minor that the failure
to do it would still leave the contract substantially performed so that recovery might
be had.
88 Utah at 518, 56 P.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
That simply is not the case here, however.

By Daniels'

own admission, the request to make the repairs was rescinded before
he corrected or caused to be corrected any of the alleged deficiency
in the performance of the original contract.

(R. 50.)

Daniels attempts to make much of the fact that he was
"ordered" back to the job site by the owner of the property.

Ad-

mittedly, several of the Utah cases cited on the issue of substanshort period of time including the repair of an allegedly
defective roof (although the evidence was conflicting
as to how the need for repair arose) . Wilcox v. Cloward,
supra, 56 P.2d at 6.
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tiality deal with a situation in which a contractor undertook, at
the contractor's own initiative, to perform additional services
or provide additional materials.

The cases correctly note that

such voluntary actions could not extend the time for filing a mechanic's lien.

This concept, however, is not an element of the

test of what is substantial work in connection with the contract.
An entirely different issue would be before this Court
if Daniels had actually performed the repairs requested.

As the

case stands, however, the trial court correctly determined that
Daniels' work on December 1, 1985 was not, as a matter of law,
substantial in relation to the Appellant's original contract.
2.

Timeliness. Daniels also fails the alternative test

enunciated by this Court because the services rendered on December
1, 1981 were not proximate in time to the performance of the original contract.

Daniels himself considered the Project to have been

"absolutely completed" in the summer of 1981. Not a shred of evidence in the record indicates that, at that time, the owner or
Daniels believed that any additional work remained to be completed
on the original contract.

The pipes froze on December 1, 1981,

more than four months after all parties believed the Project had
been completed. The defective plumbing was at best a latent defect
the discovery of which was serendipitous (though unfortunate) and
could have occurred much later.
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This is not a case such as Totorica v. Thomas, supra,
where both owner and contractor understood that there were "some
odds and ends" which needed to be completed after occupancy was
possible but which were delayed because of weather and other factors.

16 Utah 2d at 176, 397 P. 2d at 985.

The Wilcox case is

the only other cited case in which the time for filing the mechanic's lien was deemed extended because of the substantiality of
work.

There, over a period of six weeks, the contractor had per-

formed a series of tasks to complete his contract which concluded
with repair of a faulty roof.

88 Utah at 508 56 P.2d at 6.

In

Carlisle v. Cox, the delivery and installation of all but one heat
register in connection with the performance of a furnace contract
was deemed to be "last work" for purposes of establishing the time
from which the action for recovery had to be filed.

The court

held that installation of the final register, less than two months
later, could not further extend the time for filing.

506 P. 2d at

62.
This Court has consistently held that the issue of "substantiality" is generally a question of fact.

As demonstrated by

the Carlisle v. Cox decision, however, the court has also recognized that in some instances this issue may be concluded as a matter
of law. 29 Utah 2d at 139, 506 P.2d at 62. Deseret Federal submits
that the trial court properly determined that the work performed
by Daniels on December 1, 1981 was, as a matter of law, insubstan- 16 -

tial and not closely related in time to the original performance
of the contract so as to extend the deadline for filing the lien.
B.

The work performed on December 1, 1985 was insufficient
to establish an independent basis that entitled Daniels
to file a notice of mechanics lien for the work so performed.
The trial court correctly determined that the work per-

formed by Daniels, consisting of inspection of damages, assessment of work necessary for repair, and contacting subcontractors
to undertake the repair work, did not entitle him to a mechanic's
lien, under Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-3 (1953, as amended).
Daniels would have this Court adopt a construction of the
Utah mechanic's lien statute, and Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann.,
in particular, that completely ignores the express language of
the statute and the developed case law which establishes the type
of work which entitles a contractor to claim a mechanic's lien.
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann., requires that the contractor's services must be "used in the construction, alteration,
or improvement" of a building, structure, or improvement of premises.

The trial court correctly found that there was no material

issue of fact that precluded its determination that Daniels had
performed no services which would entitle him to a mechanic's lien.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Daniels, it is
clear that his labor on December 1., 1981 was merely preliminary
efforts toward effectuating repairs or maintenance of the plumbing
system.

In Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924, this
- 17 -

Court expressly noted that "[o]rdinary maintenance or cleanup work"
did not constitute an "improvement" for purposes of establishing
mechanics' liens with respect to a project*
This Court has consistently ruled that there must be
some contribution to an improvement on the land as a basis for a
mechanic's lien*

See Calder Bros, Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922,

924 & n. 1 (Utah 1982) ; First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N.
Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 524-25 (Utah 1979).

As stated in

the Zundel cases
The purpose of [mechanic's] lien statutes
is to protect those who have added directly
to the value of property by performing labor
or furnishing materials upon ite
600 P.2d at 524-25 (quoting Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis,
9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959)).

(Emphasis added).

See also Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 181, 183-84.
In the instant case, Daniels simply added no value whatsoever to the property by virtue of improvement, alteration, construction, or repair by virtue of any labor undertaken on December 1, 1981.
Daniels would rely on the decision of this Court in Zions
First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970) .
There this Court recognized that an architect has a right to a
mechanic's lien under Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended) for services rendered in preparing plans, even though
those plans "may not be brought to fruition by erection of the
- 18 -

building." This holding is simply inapposite to the case presently
before this Court.
The statutory language granting architects and engineers
a right to a mechanic's lien does not include the limiting language
"in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building"
that applies to a contractor's mechanic's lien.

The trial court

correctly determined that, under the clear language of Utah's mechanic's lien statute, Daniels' work on December 1, 1981 could not
raise an entitlement to a mechanic's lien.3
The trial court further correctly pointed out that Daniels
was not asked to prepare an "estimate of costs" but to repair or
otherwise correct a defective original performance.
Daniels asserts, without the citation of any authority
or even a clear rationale, that a distinction among different types
of lien claimants is somehow unconstitutional.

The right to a

The trial court distinguished among three categories of
lien claimants (contractors, mining contractors, and
architects and similarly situated professionals) and
noted that the performance required for a claim of mechanic's lien under Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953,
as amended) is different for each of these groups. The
Utah mechanic's lien statute does not, however, create
separate classifications of mechanics' liens. Section
38-1-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) specifically
provides that all mechanics' liens are on "equal footing."
Furthermore, Section 38-1-5, relating to priority of
mechanics' liens, specifically provides that all liens
relate to the commencement of visible work on the ground.
In Zions First National v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464
P.2d 387, 389 (1970), the court specifically noted that
the priority issue that would arise under Section 38-15 was not before the court.
- 19 -

mechanic's lien is clearly a creation of statute.

In delimiting

non-suspect classifications in a statutory framework that does
not impinge upon fundamental rights, the constitutional test is
that the legislature must have a rational basis, consistent with
the objectives of the statute, for the distinctions made.

See

Thompson v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 724 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1986);
Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P*2d 80 (Utah 1982) • The rational basis
for the classification system of the Utah mechanic's lien statute
is readily apparent when considering the policies behind the statute.
The purposes of a mechanic's lien statute are two-fold:
first, to protect the interest of mechanics and materialmen; and
second, to provide a system of notices under which individuals
involved in various aspects of the business of construction and
mining, including financial institutions engaged in the business
of loaning money to permit such development, may have certainty
as to conflicting claims to property. In connection with the second
of these purposes, the legislature and the courts of this State
have consistently applied a policy requiring notice, by virtue of
the visibility of improvements, as the basis for granting priority
to a mechanic's lien over subsequent interests. See First of Denver
Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 525-26
(Utah 1979) ; Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction
Co. , 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967).
- 20 -

This policy is inherent

in the limiting language that applies to contractors, subcontractors, and other persons requiring that the services be performed
in connection with the "construction, alteration, or improvement"
of property.
The legislature recognized, however, that the services
performed by architects and engineers, although conferring a substantial benefit on the owner of property, will never constitute
visible improvements unless brought to fruition by other contractors.

On this basis, the legislature made a rational distinction

between the architects and engineers on the one hand, and other
contractors on the other.

Indeed, prior to 1933 the liens for

mechanics and architects were granted in separate sections.

See

Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, supra, 464 P.2d at 388-89.
Although the mechanic's lien statute is to be construed
liberally in favor of protecting mechanic's lien interests, such
construction does not permit, let alone require, that the express
statutory language be ignored.

This Court has recognized that

"wherever possible effect should be given to every part of an Act."
Totorica v. Thomas, supra, 397 P.2d at 987.
The basis for Daniels7 reliance on the case of Calder
Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), and particularly
the reliance on the emphasized language of the material from that
case quoted in Daniels' Brief, is far from clear. The Calder Bros.
case, unlike the case presently before the Court, did not deal
- 21 -

with the validity of liens under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, but rather
with the priority of mechanic's liens under the "relation back"
principle embodied in Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended).

If anything, the Calder Bros, case illustrates that

different types of work, notably repairs, may be treated less favorably than other work of construction for purposes of the mechanic's
lien law.

Recognizing the notice policy behind the mechanics

lien statute, the Calder Bros, court recognized that "[o]rdinary
maintenance or clean-up work" is in a different category from other
services done in connection with the construction, alteration, or
improvement.

652 P.2d at 924. The "tacking" discussed in Calder

Bros. deals only with assessing what types of services are performed
in connection with a single project for purposes of placing all
mechanics and materialmen for that project on equal footing under
the mechanic's lien priority scheme.

Such principles relate to

the issue of commencement of work for establishing priority, not
to the determination of when the last work was performed for determining when a notice of lien may be validly filed.

The Calder

Bros, decision fails to support Daniels' position.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, THAT DESERET FEDERAL IS NOT ESTOPPED
TO ASSERT THE UNTIMELY FILING OF DANIELS'
NOTICE OF LIEN TO INVALIDATE THE CLAIMED LIEN
Anticipating a holding that his activity at the Project
on December 1, 1981, was insufficient to extend the statutory period
- 22 -

within which he was required to file his Notice of Lien, Daniels
argues that the owner of the Project is estopped to assert the
late filing to invalidate the lien and, in addition, that Deseret
Federal is also estopped.
The Utah Mechanic's Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7
(1953) , required Daniels to file a Notice of his claimed lien within
100 days from when he completed his contract, or November 8, 1981.
Daniels did not file a Notice of Lien until February 2, 1982, nearly
three months late. (R. 36).
According to Daniels, he didn't timely file because in
late October or early November of 1980, one of the Projects7 owners
requested Daniels "not to file a mechanic's lien within the time
permitted by law and stated to him that if he would refrain from
filing, his claim would be paid in two weeks."

(R.

84.)

Based

upon the owner's request and Daniels' reliance upon that request,
Daniels argues that the owner is estopped to assert the late filing
to invalidate his claimed lien.

Furthermore, Daniels argues that

because he recorded his Notice of Lien, albeit three months late,
before Deseret Federal recorded its Deed of Trust, Deseret Federal
is also estopped since the Utah Recording Act imparts constructive
notice to the world of claimed interests in property from and after
the date the instrument evidencing that interest is recorded. Utah
Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1953).

Thus, Daniels argues, subsequent pur-

chasers or mortgagees take subject to the prior recorded interest.
- 23 -

Ochoa v. Hernandez v Morales, 230 U e S e 139 (1913).

As will be

shown below, the Recording Act has no application to the Utah Mechanic's Lien Act*
Despite the notice provision of the Recording Act, the
Utah Mechanic's Lien Act imparts constructive notice to the world
of claimed mechanic's lien interests from and after the time visible
improvements have been made on the ground and the priority of the
mechanic's lien relates back to that time if the lien is properly
perfected.

Utah Code Ann* § 38-1-3 (1953); Western Mortgage Loan

Corp. v. Cottonwood Co.. 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967).
Thus, in priority disputes involving mechanic's lien claimants,
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, such as Deseret Federal, who
record their interest take subject to as yet unperfected mechanic's
liens, assuming those liens are subsequently perfected. Obviously,
in March of 1982, visible improvements had been made at the Project, since construction was complete by July 30, 1981. (Deposition
of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 48-49.) It follows that all persons dealing
with the Project after July 30, 1981, including mortgagees such
as Deseret Federal, had constructive notice that as yet unperfected
mechanic's liens might attach to the Project. The fact that Daniels
recorded a Notice of Lien before Deseret Federal recorded its Deed
of Trust did nothing to enhance the constructive notice already
imparted to Deseret Federal; nor did it establish priority since
the priority of Daniels' claimed lien related back to August of
- 24 -

1980 when visible improvements were made on the ground; consequently, Daniels' position as against Deseret Federal was not improved
merely because he recorded first.4
Since the fact that Daniels recorded first does nothing
to further the analysis of the validity of his lien, the real issue
is: Even assuming that the owner is estopped to assert the untimely
filing of Daniels' Notice of Lien5, is Deseret Federal? Judge Fishier held that Deseret Federal was not estopped and, as will be
demonstrated below, this Court should affirm that holding.
This Court has recognized that the Mechanic's Liens Act
must be construed on the theory that some of the provisions are
intended to protect the mechanic and others are intended to protect
the owner, while still others are intended to protect subsequent
purchasers or mortgagee.

Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah

241, 87 P.2d 714 (1906). Deseret Federal submits that the requireThe Notice is devoid of assertions giving notice
of a claim of estoppel. Rather, it references
only a date of last work of December 1, 1981.
If work was performed on this date, Daniels
would have priority as to such work. However,
the Notice of Lien clearly provides no notice
of any other claim which would extend a filing
date for the bulk of the amount claimed.
For purposes of this appeal only, Deseret Federal is will to concede that an owner may, in
appropriate circumstances, be estopped to assert
the untimeliness of the filing of a Notice of
Lien. It is not clear, however, that his Court
has ever so held. Indeed, the policy considerations that form the basis for the statutory
scheme, militate against such a position.
- 25 -

ment that a Notice of Lien be timely filed is designed to protect
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. See General Electric Supply
Co, etc., v. Bennett, 626 P.2d 844 Monto 844, 847 (1981) (the purpose of requiring the recording of a notice of lien is to protect
all parties dealing with the property, including innocent third
parties and subsequent purchasers.)
By necessity, as a trade-off for giving mechanics priority
as of the time visible improvements were commenced on the ground,
the legislature required mechanics to file a Notice of Lien within
one hundred days after completing their contract.
§ 38-1-7 (1953).
the claimed lien.

Utah Code Ann.

Failure to record within that time invalidates
Naale v. Club Fountainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125,

405 Po2d 346 (1965). The obvious legislative purpose for requiring
contractors, such as Daniels, to record a Notice of Lien within
one hundred days is to allow subsequent purchasers or mortgagees,
such as Deseret Federal, to adequately assess the risk that mechanics liens may attach to the property and relate back to when
visible improvements were made*

If any improvements exist on the

ground, constructive notice is imparted to the world that mechanic's
liens may be extant.6
6

If those liens are later perfected within

The provisions of Section 38-1-7 establishing
the time within which notices must be filed
clearly limit the exposure of third-parties
dealing with property upon which improvements
have been made* Such a third-party takes subject only to liens for work completed during
the 100 day period preceding the date of the
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the statutory time limits, subsequent purchasers or mortgagees will
take subject to them.

To assist buyers and lenders in assessing

the risk of such liens, the legislature imposed the 100 day limit
during which the contractor was required to perfect the lien.

In

other words, when dealing with improved property, there are no
guarantees that there are no outstanding, yet unperfected, mechanic's liens which, according to the Mechanics7 Lien Act, would relate
back and take priority to the interest of a subsequent purchaser
or mortgagee.

However, the requirement that a Notice of Lien be

recorded within one hundred days affords the subsequent purchaser
or mortgagee the opportunity to assess that risk.
If mechanics were not required to perfect their interest
by recording a Notice of Lien within a relatively short time period,
the alienability of land would be substantially impaired. In fact,
if there were no limiting period, improved land would be essentially
inalienable.

Thus, the requirement that a Notice of Lien be re-

third-party's interest.
To hold otherwise
renders entirely meaningless the notice filing
requirements.
Thus, Deseret Federal could
take subject only to liens for lienable work
completed after November 17, 1981 (100 days
prior to February 25, 1982). As demonstrated
elsewhere in the Brief, no lienable work was
performed after November 17, 1981. Assuming
that it can be objectively determined that
all work on a project was completed prior to
the beginning of the 100 day period, third
parties should, as a matter of policy, take
property free and clear of any mechanic lien
claims regardless of their filing date. This
case is such a case.
- 27 -

corded within 100 days after completion of the contract is obviously
designed to afford subsequent purchasers or mortgagees the ability
to assess the risk of outstanding unperfected mechanics' liens,
which, in turn, promotes the free alienability of lando

Since

the requirement that a Notice of Lien be filed within one hundred
days after completion of the contract is designed to protect third
parties dealing with property, Daniels' argument that third parties
may be estopped, based upon the owner's conduct, from asserting
the late filing to invalidate the lien is without merit*
The privilege of asserting a mechanic's lien is conferred
by statute, and although the statute should be liberally construed
to effect its objective of protecting mechanics, compliance with
the requirements of the statute is required before a party is entitled to its benefits•

AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Develop-

ment and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986).
This requirement of strict compliance is very compelling
in the context of the timely filing of a Notice of Lien* As demonstrated above, the requirement that a Notice of Lien be recorded
within 100 days primarily benefits subsequent purchasers or mortgagees.

As pointed out by the authoritative treatise on statutory

construction:

"laws enacted for the protection of third persons

should not be permitted to be waived since third persons interested
in the statutes are not made party to the waiver*ff

N* Singer 2A

Sutherland Statutory Instruction, § 5508 (Sands 4th ed. 1984) This
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policy should also be applied to Daniels7 estoppel agreement.

To

estop a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee from asserting the untimely filing of a Notice of Lien because the owner promised to
make payment would, as pointed out by Judge Fishier in his Memorandum Decision, "allow owners and individual mechanic's lien claimants to determine the priority of other lien claimants whether
they were other mechanics lien claimants or holders of trust deeds
and mortgages. This would create confusion in the law, which would
be intolerable."

(R. 238-9.)

For example, all subsequent purchasers or mortgagees of
improved property take with constructive notice of as yet unperfected mechanic's liens.

Consequently, if the owner was estopped

to assert the late filing of a Notice of Lien or could waive the
recording of a Notice of Lien, those subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees, having constructive notice of the lien, would take
subject to the lien.

As a result subsequent purchasers and mort-

gagees would always be subject to side deals between owners and
mechanics.
deals.

There would be no effective way to discover these side

Mechanics, by not recording their Notice of Lien, could

induce subsequent purchasers to purchase the property or mortgagees
to lend money against the property.

They would then take advan-

tage of the statute's protection and claim priority over those subsequent purchasers or mortgagees.

This court should not sanction
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less than arms-length deals between owners and mechanics to dupe
third parties.
Deseret Federal does not contend that owners, subsequent
purchasers or mortgagees should never be estopped to assert the
late recording of a Notice of Lien to invalidate the claimed lien.
Rather, Deseret Federal urges this court to adopt the principle
that strict compliance with the mechanic's lien requirements for
perfection of the lien is required; however, the equitable doctrine
of estoppel may be applied as against the party creating the estoppel .

In this case, although the owner of the Project might be

estopped to assert the untimely filing to invalidate the lien,
Deseret Federal should not.

As this Court stated in Utah Savings

and Loan Association v. Mecham. 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961) :
There is no doubt but that a mortgagee may be
estopped from claiming a priority over a mechanic's lienc However, in order to establish
an estoppel against the mortgagee, the lien
claimant must show some concealment, misrepresentation, act, or declaration by the mortgagee
upon which the lienholder properly relied and
by which he was induced to act differently
than he would have otherwise have acted.
12 Utah 2d at 441, 366 P.2d at 602.
Similarly, in In re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (Bankr. Utah
1984) , Judge Clark applied the principle enunciated in Utah Savings
and Loan v. Mecham.

In that case, the owner completed the Notice

of Lien forms for the mechanic's lien claimants.

The Notices of

Lien did not comply with the requirements of the Utah Mechanic's
- 30 -

Lien Act.

These defects included the omission of the expiration

date of the notary's commission and the lack of oaths and/or acknowledgments.

Judge Clark held that the mechanics' failure to

comply with the statutory requirements invalidated the liens.
The mechanics argued that because the owner completed, acknowledged
and notarized the Notice of Lien forms, the owner and subsequent
mortgagees should be estopped from asserting their invalidity.
Judge Clark disagreed with this argument holding:
This estoppel argument would be a persuasive
defense against an attack made on these notices
by the [owner] who could not be allowed to
enjoy the fruits of his errors at the expense
of those injured thereby. However, in this
case, the lien notices are being attacked by
a third creditor, who, according to the record
before the court, had nothing to do with creating the defective notices. As to him the lienholders' estoppel argument . . . must fail.
43 B.R. at 824.
In support of his argument that Deseret Federal is estopped from asserting the untimely filing of his Notice of Lien
to invalidate the lien, Daniels refers this court to Rice v. Granite
School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). In that case,
the defendant school district was estopped to assert plaintiff's
failure to file a Notice of Claim within ninety days as required
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The failure to file was,

according to this Court, induced by the defendant's insurance agent's promises to get the matter settled.

This court reversed

the trial court's dismissal of the action because of the untimely
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filing, on the grounds that where the delay in commencing the action
was induced by the conduct of the defendant or its insurance adjustor acting in its behalf, the defendant cannot raise non-compliance with the notice requirement as a defense. Deseret Federal
accepts this Court's decision in Rice as the law, but submits that
Rice is consistent with the Utah Savings and In re Williamson decisions requiring active conduct on the part of the mortgagee before
the mortgager can be estopped. In this case, since Deseret Federal
did nothing to give rise to an estoppel, it simply cannot be estopped.
Daniels relies heavily in his Brief upon the case of
Beltline Brick Co. v. Standard Home Building, 213 N.W. 41 (1927).
Deseret Federal submits that although the Beltline Brick decision
appears to support Daniels' argument, it is contrary to the policies underlying the requirements of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Act
which are designed to protect both mechanics and third parties
dealing with the property.

If the Beltline Brick rationale were

adopted by this Court, the one hundred day filing requirement and
the protection afforded by its enforcement would be eviscerated.
Mechanics could file late and claim an estoppel to contest
the late filing, or that the owner waived the filing time period.
Those mechanics would thereby obtain leverage against the owner
by clouding the title to the property thereby impairing its alienability.

Furthermore, mechanics could simply not file until the
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property were sold or mortgaged and then claim priority over the
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee.
Daniels played this game. In his Brief, Daniels unabashedly admits that the "owner, who was trying to obtain refinancing
before the expiration of the one hundred day period requested Daniels not to lien the property and if he refrained from doing so,
he would be paid in two weeks." (Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) Daniels
wasn't paid in two weeks, yet he waited another three months to
file. His Notice of Lien stated the last work performed was December 1 —

but gave not notice whatsoever of the existence of his

claim of estoppel.

In addition, Daniels did not object to Judge

Dee's Order Discharging Claims.

In fact, he stipulated that the

Order could continue in effect for another four months until he
finally realized that the owner wasn't going to pay him.

In es-

sence, Daniels did everything necessary to induce Deseret Federal
into lending money to the owner.

Thus, his claim that Deseret

Federal should be estopped is somewhat disingenuous.
In summary, if mechanics do not comply with the statutory
requirements for perfecting their lien interest, those mechanics
should bear the risk of non-payment. After all, it is the mechanic
who has dealt with the owner, has not been paid and is in the best
position to assess the owner's propensity for truthfulness and
dependability.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth above, and the cases
cited thereinf this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling
that Daniels' claimed mechanic's lien is invalid.

m
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DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ.
CARL F. HUEFNER, ESQ.
CHARLES P. SAMPSON,ESQ.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Respondent Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan
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ADDENDUM

38-1-7

LIENS

38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — Service on owner of property*
(1) Every original contractor within 100 days after the completion of his
contract, and except as provided in this section, every person other than the
original contractor who claims the benefit of this chapter within 80 days
after furnishing the last material or performing the last labor for or on any
land, building, improvement, or structure, or for any alteration, addition to,
repair of, performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any
mine or mining claim, shall file for record with the county recorder of the
county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a
written notice to hold and claim a lien.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the
name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he
furnished the material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first
and last material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent, and
the date signed
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall
deliver or mail by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record
owner of the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the record owner's
current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be
mailed to the last known address of the record owner, using the names and
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of
the county where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes the lien
claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as
stated in Subsections (1) through (3) at the request of an original contractor, then the final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold and
claim a lien for a subcontractor or a person furnishing labor or material at
the request of an original contractor is 80 days after completion of the
original contract of the original contractor.
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A. DEAN JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
Post Office Box 783
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
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GEORGE A. HUNT
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant Deseret Federal
Savings and Loan Association
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
-vJACK C. DANIELS, et al.,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants,
JACK C. DANIELS,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
-vDESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

Civil No.

6790

The motion of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal
Savings & Loan Association came on regularly for hearing
before this Court on March S, 1984, the Honorable Philip R.
Fishier, District Judge, presiding, George A. Hunt of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau and A. Dean Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs
appearing for Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings S
Loan Association and Gordon A. Madsen of Madsen & Cummings
c

appearing for Third-Party Plaintiff Jack Daniels, and the
Court having heard argument of counsel and having reviewed
the memoranda on file with the Court and having requested
supplemental memoranda from counsel and the same having been
filed, and the deposition of Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Jack C. Daniels having been published and the Court being
fully advised in the premises and having rendered its Memorandum
Decision in the matter on April 6, 1984, granting the motion
of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion
to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association be and the same hereby is granted and judgment
is rendered in its favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff Jack"
C« Daniels, no cause of action•
DATED this
jfm —
day of April, 1984 •
BY THE COURT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
VS.

. j
]
]

JACK C. DANIELS, DEBRA ESTES,
SCOTT BERRY, DEBRA ANN SITZBERGER, and AMY STANTON EAGLESON,
Defendants.

]
]
]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case No. 86-0466

JACK C. DANIELS,
Third Party Plaintiff,
and Appellant

i

Category No. 13.b.

vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, A-ONE CONSTRUCTION, INC., MILLER BRICK SALES,
EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R.
McCOY,
Third Party Defendants
and Deseret Federal Savings
& Loan Association being
also respondent.

GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
Jack C.
225 South
Salt Lake

MADSEN, ESQ.
CUMMINGS, ESQ.
for Appellant,
Daniels
200 East, #150
City, Utah 84111

CARL F. HUEFNER, ESQ.
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG &
HANSON
Attorneys for Respondent,
Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage prepaid this

^?'^

dav of

Gordon A.
Robert C.
225 South
Salt Lake

March, 1986, to:
Madsen, Esq.
Cummings, Esq.
200 East, #150
City, Utah 84111
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